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TAGS: [AORC](#) [CDG](#) [ENRG](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UNGA](#)
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SUBJECT: FRENCH FEEDBACK ON NPT GOALS

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Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 b and d

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¶1. (C) Summary. On February 18, MFA desk officer for nuclear nonproliferation Celine Jurgensen said France's goal for the third Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) PrepCom is concrete progress in all three pillars of the nonproliferation regime, looking ahead to the 2010 Review Conference. As today's challenges and expectations are weighty, France seeks to consolidate the NPT regime and demonstrate the regime's ability to address issues like the Iranian crisis and increasing interest in civil nuclear energy. Jurgensen suggested concrete deliverables the U.S. and France could work towards now for the third PrepCom in May, such as a P5 statement, and suggested a P3 meeting occur at the first opportunity. She also said France will prepare a discussion paper that will serve as a written response to reftel demarche, most likely in mid-March following interagency coordination. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Jurgensen noted that the first two PrepComs were successful, but many of the biggest challenges have yet to be addressed. With the Iranian crisis not yet resolved, producing consensus at the PrepCom will be very difficult. Expectations for the 2010 Review Conference are even more difficult to calibrate today given uncertainty in two major issues, the Iranian crisis and the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship. Jurgensen stated that the French are very interested in the positive signals sent so far by Secretary Clinton regarding a post-START arrangement, possible Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification, and pursuance of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

¶3. (C) Jurgensen said in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, all three pillars must be addressed with concrete building blocks. She said France's goal is to be as pragmatic as possible to move beyond mere good intentions; to do so will require advance consensus with key allies on shared priorities for deliverables. On the nonproliferation pillar, in addition to Iran, consequences for noncompliance and withdrawal must be addressed, especially on civilian nuclear cooperation. France will continue to promote the EU's proposal from the first PrepCom, in keeping with the EU's strategy document "New Lines for EU Actions to Combat Proliferation" endorsed in December 2008. Regarding peaceful uses of nuclear technology, France's goal is to ensure that developing countries' interest in civil nuclear energy is carried out in the best conditions for nonproliferation, safety and security. She cited as an example the NTI/IAEA fuel bank initiative to which the EU has

agreed to contribute "up to 25 million euros." On the disarmament pillar, Jurgensen cited two key priorities, the CTBT, to which she said the U.S. could make a major progress by ratification, and opening negotiations on an FMCT. She said France also sees post-START negotiations as key, and would welcome any ongoing commentaries or reflections from us on their status. Jurgensen also pointed to the EU's action plan and the letter President Sarkozy sent to Ban Ki-Moon during the French EU Presidency.

¶4. (C) Jurgensen suggested a few concrete ways the U.S. and France could begin closer coordination. She noted a French proposal presented at the first and second PrepComs that the U.S. did not cosponsor, largely due to time restrictions. France would still like to promote this proposal, and would greatly appreciate U.S. co-sponsorship (she noted the UK signed on at the time as a cosponsor). Second, Jurgensen said even a short P5 declaration at the next PrepCom would send a strong positive signal about the NPT regime's strength even in the face of the Iran crisis. As an example, simply confirming the intention of the U.S. and Russia to work on post-START negotiations, with support from the other members, would be useful, or announcing a conference on transparency, verification and confidence-building measures per the UK's standing proposal for the September 2009 timeframe. Jurgensen noted that she has had no updates from the UK on Russian or Chinese responses to their conference proposal, but said that if the conference occurs, it should be announced by the P5 as a show of unity. Any such declaration would first need to be discussed among the P3, of course, and Jurgensen said France would support a P3 meeting at the first opportunity. Finally, she noted that ideally a more substantive joint P5 declaration could be developed for the 2010 Review Conference.

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